Beliefs about climate change divide the U.S. public along party lines more distinctly than hot social issues. Research finds that better educated or informed respondents are more likely to align with their parties on climate change. This information-elite polarization resembles a process of biased assimilation first described in psychological experiments. In nonexperimental settings, college graduates could be prone to biased assimilation if they more effectively acquire information that supports their beliefs. Recent national and statewide survey data show response patterns consistent with biased assimilation (and biased guessing) contributing to the correlation observed between climate beliefs and knowledge. The survey knowledge questions involve key, uncontroversial observations such as whether the area of late-summer Arctic sea ice has declined, increased, or declined and then recovered to what it was 30 years ago. Correct answers are predicted by education, and some wrong answers (e.g., more ice) have predictors that suggest lack of knowledge. Other wrong answers (e.g., ice recovered) are predicted by political and belief factors instead. Response patterns suggest causality in both directions: science information affecting climate beliefs, but also beliefs affecting the assimilation of science information.
INTRODUCTION
Since the idea that human emissions of carbon dioxide could alter the Earth's climate was first proposed by Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius in 1896, it has developed from a scientific hypothesis into a broad area of research, cumulatively drawing on data from many different fields (Weart 2008) . In recent decades, however, even as the scientific consensus strengthened, dissensus among the U.S. public deepened (Dunlap and McCright 2008) . Beliefs about the reality of global warming, or more broadly anthropogenic climate change, became a new wedge issue dividing the U.S. public along party lines more distinctly than hot social issues.
[1] Many people base their beliefs about physical reality on what they think would be the socioeconomic or political implications if human-caused climate change were true.
One striking feature of public beliefs about climate change has been the pattern of informationelite polarization. Surveys find that college-educated respondents are more likely than others to line up with their parties on climate change. Similarly, respondents who express greater confidence in their own understanding of the issue, and even those who score better on scienceliteracy scales, show wider partisan and ideological divisions (Hamilton 2008 (Hamilton , 2011a Hamilton and Keim 2009; Hamilton et al. 2012; Kahan et al. 2011a Kahan et al. , 2011b McCright 2011; McCright and Dunlap 2011) . Belief and concern about anthropogenic climate change increase with education or science literacy among individuals who identify themselves as Democrats or liberals, but do not increase (and may even decrease) with education or literacy among Republicans and conservatives.
This pattern resembles the outcome of biased assimilation leading to attitude polarization, a process observed in experimental data by Lord et al (1979;  developed further by Munro and Ditto 1997; Munro et al. 2002; Corner et al. 2011) . Biased assimilation refers to the selective acquisition or interpretation of new information in ways that reinforce preexisting beliefs. Experimental exposure to new information therefore can increase polarization. In the nonexperimental world of public beliefs about climate change, more educated individuals likely are more effective in acquiring new information themselves through news media, blogs and other sources, and in framing new information they encounter. Often their efforts tend to strengthen existing beliefs instead of change them, leading to greater polarization. Similar ideas arise frequently in studies of climate-change beliefs, with varied theoretical frameworks including mental models Read et al. 1994; Leiserowitz et al. 2010; Reynolds et al. 2011 ), cultural cognition (Kahan et al. 2011b , motivated skepticism and confirmation bias (Taber and Lodge 2006) , ideological filtering and information processing (Borick and Rabe 2010; Wood and Vedlitz 2007) , elite cues (Brulle 2012; Darmofal 2005; Krosnik et al. 2000) , or reinforcing spirals (Zhao 2009 ).
Biased assimilation (along with other frameworks) implies that people's general beliefs about the reality or causes of climate change can influence their acceptance of specific information such as reports from scientists. For example, recent Arctic warming has been widely characterized by scientists as evidence of climate change, and specifically of the polar amplification predicted by climate models (IPCC 2007; Richardson et al. 2009 ). Arctic ice loss, with its consequences for polar bears, resource development and territorial claims, has drawn media attention and rising public awareness (Hamilton et al. 2012) . Countering scientific reports of unusual warming, however, have been other narratives mainly from non-expert sources suggesting that Arctic warming is not well established, or just cyclical, or has already reversed. Such counter-narratives have been widely publicized too, supplying people who do not believe climate is changing with information that reinforces their own beliefs. Thus, perceptions about Arctic trends could sometimes be a consequence of general beliefs, rather than simply being information that helps to shape those beliefs in the first place. Some other specific climate facts and arguments likely have this attribute as well. The following sections examine survey questions on climate beliefs and knowledge for signs of such effects.
SURVEY QUESTIONS ABOUT CLIMATE BELIEFS AND KNOWLEDGE
Our data come from a series of random-sample telephone surveys conducted in 2011 and 2012. Since 2001, the Granite State Poll has surveyed random samples of about 500 New Hampshire residents four times each year. Interviewers ask a variety of background, political opinion, voting and other topical questions. Starting in 2010, climate-change questions were added to the mix. Several recurring questions now form a unique quarterly time series tracking public opinion about climate change (Hamilton 2011b) . In June 2011, the Granite State Poll also began testing climate-related science questions. Table 1 gives the wording for six climate belief or knowledge questions, with New Hampshire poll results in the right-hand column.
Four of these questions also were carried on a U.S. national survey called NCERA in August 2011. NCERA was designed by Carsey Institute researchers to provide national benchmarks comparable to their Community and Environment in Rural America (CERA) regional surveys (Hamilton and Keim 2009) . The left-hand column in Table 1 gives response percentages for the climate questions on NCERA. Both NCERA and the Granite State Poll employ random sampling with probability weighting methods, and check results against Census profiles to ensure results that represent U.S. or New Hampshire populations.
Our belief and knowledge questions are stated in neutral, fact-oriented terms. None mention values, policy choices or future outcomes. The climate changing now/human option of Belief CC corresponds to the main point of public statements on climate change by major science organizations and national academies (e.g., AAAS 2007; NRC 2010). Knowledge questions each address central and well-discussed observations upon which both contrarian and mainstream scientists agree. They do not address attribution or impacts, and as survey questions do not require agreement that anthropogenic climate change presents a serious problem.
Response percentages in Table 1 show substantial similarity between U.S. and New Hampshire results. Slightly more than half the respondents believe that climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities. Around 70 percent know that Arctic sea ice covers less area than it did 30 years ago. Just over 60 percent know that carbon dioxide concentration is rising, and 55 percent correctly identify the meaning of "greenhouse effect." Two more difficult questions about volcanoes and sea level, from the most recent New Hampshire survey, draw pluralities of "don't know" responses. Figure 1 charts the demographic bases of climate belief on the NCERA national survey. Bars indicate the weighted percentage who believe that climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities. There are gender and age effects, with stronger impacts from education. Political party, however, dominates the demographic predictors of climate beliefs.
REAL AND PERCEIVED ARCTIC ICE
The area of ice covering Arctic seas has declined visibly through the period of satellite observation. Reduction has been statistically significant in every month of the year, but most pronounced in late summer when the northern annual cycle reaches its minimum. Although daily satellite observations go back only to the 1970s, declassified Cold War submarine observations show that Arctic ice has been declining since the 1950s, so the remaining cover increasingly consists of thinner seasonal ice (Kwok and Rothrock 2009). Historical records indicate that the seasonal ice zone, an area of northern seas that is ice-covered in winter but not in late summer, has been expanding gradually since 1870, and more rapidly in the past three decades (Kinnard et al. 2008) . Proxy evidence suggests that the recent declines in Arctic sea ice extent and volume are unprecedented over the past 1,450 years (Kinnard et al. 2011) if not more (Polyak et al. 2010) , as is the intrusion of warmer Atlantic waters into the Arctic Ocean (Spielhagen et al. 2011 ). In the past few decades, shelves of glacial ice more than 3,000 years old have broken apart due to warming in the Canadian Arctic (England et al. 2008 ). Thus, a broad range of indicators at decadal to millennial time scales confirm the exceptional nature of ice reductions that have recently been observed in the Arctic.
Declining Arctic sea ice has been widely mentioned in news media accounts, especially around notable events such as the historical records set in 2007 (NOAA 2011), or a submarine planting a Russian flag on the seafloor at the North Pole that same year. Concern over suggestions that sea ice decline could threaten polar bear survival (e.g., Durner et al. 2009 ) have been popularized as well. Public misconceptions that sea ice can substantially affect sea level bring further attention to this topic (Leiserowtz et al. 2010) . Numerous blogs post regular ice graphs, maps and reports; organized betting occurs on the minimum extent or area. More systematic evidence for public awareness comes from the General Social Survey, which in 2006 and 2010 asked cross-sections of the U.S. public whether they thought that "the polar ice caps have gotten larger or smaller in recent years." Although the question is not precisely worded, 77 percent in 2006 and 81 percent in 2010 answered "smaller" (Hamilton et al. 2012) .
Scientists cite the reduction in Arctic sea ice as a symptom of global warming (e.g., IPCC 2007; Richardson et al. 2009; Notz and Marotzke 2012) . Outside the channels of scientific communication, individuals and organizations wishing to challenge the reality of global warming have sought to tell the Arctic ice story differently. For example, a widely publicized Heartland Institute report that downplays global-warming concerns (Idso and Singer 2009) does not include graphs resembling Figure 2 . Instead, authors of this 2009 report cite a 1999 paper that used data just through 1998. Although the original 1999 researchers had noted a 14% decline in ice extent over 1978-1998, the Heartland Institute authors set this aside to emphasize a shorter time interval, writing that "it could be argued from their data that from 1990/91 onward [to 1998 ], sea ice area in the Arctic may have actually increased" (p.155, emphasis by Idso and Singer). One has to look closely at the 1991 to 1998 interval in Figure 2 , and ignore later years, to see the interannual variations that inspired this statement.
Another way to overlook the downward trends in Figure 2 is to focus on time windows different from the 1970s-to-present period of satellite observation. Some authors cite anecdotal accounts of earlier warm periods, or fit sinusoidal curves to data, to argue that warming comes and goes in 60-year or longer cycles (e.g., Loehle and Scafetta 2011). Alternatively, others have emphasized very short time intervals such as announcing a recovery when ice extent in 2008 and 2009 rose above the historical minimum of 2007 (e.g., Whitehouse 2010) . Even at the shortlived peak of the 2008-2009 "recovery," however, late-summer ice area remained well below any observed prior to 2007. As the polar winter approaches each fall, some bloggers herald the annual re-freeze as a recovery.
Tenuous though these arguments are, they leave floating in the infosphere suggestions that "Arctic sea ice has recovered." So who believes that claim? Figure 3 breaks down responses to our Arctic ice question by general belief about climate change. Both U.S. and New Hampshire surveys find similar patterns. Nationally, 80 percent of those who believe that climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities, also know that Arctic ice area has declined. Only 60 percent of those who believe climate is changing for natural reasons, and 32 percent of those who believe it is not changing, accept this fact. The answer that sea ice area has recovered is chosen by only 5 percent of those believing climate is changing now due to humans, 16 percent of those who believe current change is natural, and 40 percent of those who believe climate is not changing.
A science-literacy explanation for this correlation would be that people believe something other than now/human because they do not know Arctic ice has declined (along with other facts). A biased-assimilation explanation fits this correlation equally well, however: some people accept tenuous claims, or simply guess that Arctic ice recovered, because that fits better with their belief that humans are not causing change. No doubt both science-literacy and biasedassimilation/guessing processes are at work, although one detail in Figure 3 leans toward bias. Those who say they don't know or express no belief about climate change (DK/NA) are more likely than those who believe climate is not changing to say that Arctic ice has declined, and less likely than either the now/natural or not-now groups to say that Arctic ice has recovered. This detail replicates across both surveys.
REAL AND PERCEIVED CARBON DIOXIDE

2
Since the 19th century, carbon dioxide or CO has been recognized as a greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, so called because it is relatively transparent to short and medium-wavelength radiation (such as incoming ultraviolet and visible light from the sun), but tends to absorb and re-radiate longer-wavelength infrared (such as that emitted by Earth's surface). In 1896 Svante Arrhenius, building on work by his colleague Arvid Högbom, first published the hypothesis that 2 rising concentrations of CO released by burning of fossil fuels would trap more solar energy within the atmosphere and hence warm the climate. By Högbom's and Arrhenius' reckoning, an 2 anthropogenic doubling of CO concentration remained several thousand years in the future (Weart 2008) . choosing the now/human answer to Belief CC overwhelmingly know that carbon dioxide concentration is rising. However, only half those answering now/natural accept this, and only a quarter of those answering not now. More than half the NCERA now/natural respondents say that carbon dioxide concentrations are staying about the same. Again, this belief-knowledge correlation might be interpreted as a science-literacy effect (knowledge affects beliefs), but details support a biased-assimilation or biased-guessing (beliefs affect knowledge assimilation) component as well. Respondents expressing no belief about climate change answered as accurately about Keeling as the now/natural respondents -and much better than the not-now group. The superior performance of DK/NA respondents across two questions on two surveys makes sense if misperceptions of Arctic ice and carbon dioxide reflect bias rather than a simple lack of knowledge.
A weaker version of the patterns in Figures 3 and 5 occurs with responses to the Greenhouse question (not shown). On both U.S. and New Hampshire surveys, the now/human group most often knows the meaning of greenhouse effect, while the not-now group scores no better than DK/NA respondents. But the relatively weak connection between Greenhouse and Belief CC suggests that knowing the meaning of "greenhouse effect" reflects mainly science literacy, and is less subject to biased assimilation or guessing.
Although biased guessing has been mentioned with respect to Arctic ice and Keeling, it probably played a minor role as these two were answered correctly by 60 to 70 percent of respondents. The next section considers two difficult questions on which guessing seems more likely.
VOLCANOES AND SEA LEVEL
2 Do volcanoes emit more CO than humans? Which would raise sea level more if it happened: melting ice in the Himalaya, in Greenland/Antarctica, or on the Arctic Ocean? Our Volcano and Sealevel questions, like other knowledge items in Table 1 , involve central and well-discussed points accepted by contrarian as well as mainstream scientists. Unlike the earlier items they prove difficult for survey respondents to answer, with no more than a third getting each right, and larger fractions admitting they don't know. Indeed there is no reason to expect that most people should know the answers. One involves some exposure to scientific discussions, because the quantities involved are not common knowledge. The other requires a geographical sense of the relative mass of Greenland/Antarctic ice sheets compared with Himalayan glaciers, or why melting sea ice would have only minor impacts on sea level. Perhaps it is surprising that more than 60% think they do know each answer, although about half of those who think so are mistaken.
Thus, there is probably more guessing on the answers, mixed with biased assimilation and science knowledge. The net effects of these influences are not random, however. Correct answers to Volcano occur most often (45%) among those who believe humans are changing the climate. One specific wrong answer shows the opposite pattern: 6% of now/human, 24% of now/natural, and 33% of not-now respondents think that in recent decades, volcanoes 2 have released much more CO than humans. As with "Arctic ice recovery," the "volcanoes emit 2 more CO " claim has been publicized by authoritative-sounding sources (e.g., Plimer 2009) as a talking point against anthropogenic climate change, making it a good candidate for biased assimilation.
Response choices for the Sealevel question, on the other hand, include no talking points. Like a more difficult counterpart to our Greenhouse question, Sealevel invokes science literacy, and holding a particular belief about climate provides little guidance on which Sealevel answer to guess. Even so, now/human respondents most often got it right (36%), followed by the now/natural (27%) and don't know (14%) groups. That pattern on a difficult question without cues for guessing highlights the science literacy contribution. On the other hand a high proportion of DK/NA responses to Sealevel among people who do not believe climate is changing (73%) might signify their rejection of the premise that any of these melting-ice events could happen.
In summary, respondents who believe that humans are changing the climate answer more accurately on all of the knowledge questions. The content of two questions (Greenhouse and Sealevel) appears mainly to assess science literacy. Content of the other three (Arctic ice, Keeling and Volcano) has more obvious connections to particular beliefs about climate, so responses could reflect a combination of science-literacy with biased-assimilation or biasedguessing effects. Details of response patterns support this distinction. The next section examines how demographic factors, political outlook and climate beliefs together predict knowledgequestion responses. Table 2 extends these analyses by estimating the net and combined effects of demographic variables as predictors of belief, and of both demographics and belief as predictors of response to knowledge questions. The table shows results from weighted multinomial logit regressions of climatechange belief and knowledge responses on six possible predictors including Age in years; Gender (1 female, 0 male); Education (a 4-point scale, centered to 0 mean); political Party (Democrat, Independent or Republican, also centered); and the interaction term Party×Education. Centering Party and Education improves the efficiency of parameter estimates and simplifies interpretation of main effects, which then describe the effect of each variable when the other is at its mean. Mean Party corresponds roughly to Independent, and mean Education to technical school or some college. The sixth possible predictor in Table 2 is a dummy variable (Anthro CC) indicating belief that climate change is happening now, caused mainly by human activities.
PREDICTORS OF CLIMATE BELIEFS AND KNOWLEDGE
Two different models are estimated for each of the three knowledge questions in Table 2 (but only one for the Belief CC question). The left-hand column in each pair gives the regression of knowledge-question responses on the five background predictors (Age, Gender, Education, Party and Party×Education) just mentioned. These are standard predictors used in studies concerning the social bases of environmental concern (e.g., Jones and Dunlap 1992, Van Liere and Dunlap 1980), extensively validated across many previous studies but tested here as possible predictors of the new climate-knowledge questions. The right-hand column in each pair gives a model with the same predictors plus one more: belief that humans are changing the climate (Anthro CC). These second models in each pair reflect a biased-assimilation hypothesis: beliefs affect the acquisition of information, and especially of specific information that supports more general beliefs. Cross-sectional data cannot definitively test causal order, but details of response patterns support that interpretation.
Multinomial logit regression, designed for categorical dependent variables, models the odds favoring a particular outcome (such as a now/natural, not now, or DK/NA response to the Belief CC question) in contrast to a base outcome (such as now/human).
[4] Relative risk ratios in the Belief CC column describe the multiplicative effect of a unit increase in each predictor on the odds of selecting a particular Belief CC response instead of now/human, if other predictor values remain the same. A relative risk ratio below 1 means the odds favoring a particular response over the base response are decreased with each unit rise in the predictor, so ratios below 1 correspond to "negative" effects if these were transformed into additive models. Conversely, relative risk ratios above 1 mean the odds favoring that response increase with each unit rise in the predictor; they correspond to "positive" effects in an additive model. We see that older, less educated or Republican respondents are more likely to believe climate change is happening now but for natural reasons, or not happening now, or to give no answeranything but changing now because of human activities. For example, other things being equal the odds of a Republican with average education responding that climate is not changing now (rather than changing now due to humans) are 261% higher (multiplied by 3.61) compared with those of an Independent, which in turn are higher than those of a Democrat. The odds that someone of Independent political persuasion responds that climate is not changing now decrease by 18% (are multiplied by 0.82) with each one-unit rise in education. The significant Party×Education interactions mean that the odds of choosing now/natural or not now instead of now/human decrease steeply with education among self-identified Democrats, decrease less steeply with education among Independents, and are almost unrelated to education among Republicans. The remaining columns in Table 2 present two models for each of three knowledge questions. One employs demographic and political predictors only, and a second includes belief in anthropogenic climate change (Anthro CC, indicating a now/human response to Belief CC) among the predictors. Correct answers form the base categories for each question, so the relative risk ratios can be read as predicting the various wrong answers. For example, the response that late-summer Arctic sea ice has recovered to about the same area it had 30 years ago is more popular among older respondents, Republicans, and net of demographics and politics, among people who do not believe human activities are changing the climate. Republicans have roughly 89% higher odds than Independents and 257% higher odds than Democrats (multiplied by 1.89 2 = 3.57) of saying that Arctic ice has recovered instead of declined. People who believe climate change is happening now due to humans have 75% lower odds (multiplied by 0.25) of saying that ice recovered instead of declined. The equally wrong but not media-promoted assertion that Arctic ice area has increased is favored only by less educated respondents.
A similar pattern occurs with the carbon dioxide trends question (Keeling). The response that 2 CO concentrations are staying about the same instead of increasing is favored by Republican 2 respondents (odds 26% higher than Independents, 59% higher than Democrats). This CO -same response has 83% lower odds among people who believe humans that are changing the climate. The more extreme response that CO levels are decreasing shows no significant demographic or political predictors.
Greenhouse predictors exhibit a somewhat different pattern, supporting the impression that this question taps science literacy, with less potential for biased assimilation or guessing. All of the incorrect responses to Greenhouse become less likely with increasing Education. Weaker but significant party and gender effects (Democrat and female odds higher) occur on the "ozone hole" response.
Odds favoring don't-know or no-answer responses to the three knowledge questions are higher among older, less educated and female respondents. Party raises the odds of DK/NA responses on the Arctic ice and Keeling items but not on Greenhouse. Anthro CC lowers the odds of DK/NA responses on all three knowledge questions, but does so most strongly for Arctic ice and Keeling. These DK/NA patterns further support interpretation of Greenhouse responses mainly reflecting science literacy, whereas Arctic ice and Keeling responses combine science-literacy with biased-assimilation or biased-guessing effects.
The first seven columns of Table 3 replicate Table 2 models using New Hampshire instead of national data. In the New Hampshire surveys too, Belief CC is predicted by Age, Gender, Education, Party and the interaction of Party×Education. The direction and relative strength of these effects are similar across U.S. and state surveys, further encouragement that New Hampshire results are reasonably representative, and the common findings from both are robust. Predictors of Arctic ice, Keeling and Greenhouse responses also show many similarities, including consistent Party and Anthro CC effects on Arctic ice and Keeling, but not on Greenhouse. The odds of wrong answers on all three become lower with rising Education. Table 3 model responses to the difficult Volcano and Sealevel questions, tested on one New Hampshire survey. Education lowers the odds of wrong and DK/NA responses to both questions, demonstrating a science-literacy effect. Biased-assimilation or guessing effects appear likely, particularly for Volcano. Belief that humans cause climate 2 change much reduces odds of thinking that volcanoes released more CO than humans. To a lesser degree Anthro CC also reduces the odds of thinking volcanoes released the same amount as humans, or of saying I don't know. Sealevel responses show weaker and less consistent effects from political party or climate change belief. These patterns fit with an expectation that bias would have more influence on Volcano responses than on Sealevel, because the latter lacks belief-related cues.
The last four columns in
DISCUSSION
Science knowledge correlates with beliefs about climate change, but the causality is complex. On one hand, from previous research we have good evidence for knowledge shaping beliefs. Science literacy defined by a quiz of non-climate knowledge questions (e.g., Is an electron smaller than an atom?) generally predicts concern about climate change, even controlling for demographics, education and other knowledge indicators. The relationship is moderated by ideology, however, so the science-literacy effect is stronger among self-identified moderates and liberals, but weak or even negative among the most conservative (Hamilton et al. 2012 ). This plausibly reflects biased assimilation, through which some scientifically literate but ideologically motivated respondents selectively acquire information that reinforces their beliefs. Such explanations in turn imply a second kind of information, not belief-neutral background but more specific details that seem to favor particular beliefs.
[5] Although science knowledge including those specific details influences beliefs, causality can operate in the opposite direction as well, with beliefs filtering the assimilation of obviously belief-relevant knowledge.
Both directions operate with the variables studied here. Knowledge questions analyzed in this paper are more detailed than most survey items, but vary in how obviously particular answers connect with specific beliefs about climate. The greenhouse-effect definition, or which ice could most affect sea level, appear to represent background knowledge not obviously favoring or guessable from a specific climate belief. Empirically supporting this view, both are best predicted from education, with weak or absent effects from partisanship and beliefs. Respondents who accept anthropogenic climate change could more accurately answer both questions, and in this respect show higher science literacy.
In contrast, response choices for questions about trends in Arctic sea ice and carbon dioxide, or whether humans released more carbon dioxide than volcanoes, more obviously imply something about change. People who do not believe that humans are changing the climate found the scientific answers to these questions less appealing. They tended to prefer non-scientific alternatives such as "ice recovered" or "volcanoes more" that have received some media and Internet publicity -evidence for biased assimilation. Even without knowing the alternative claims, respondents' beliefs provide them with cues about which answers to choose. If one believes that climate is not changing, then probably the ice is not melting. Or, if climate is changing but humans are not the cause, then possibly volcanoes are to blame. Thus, although scientific knowledge about these facts no doubt affects climate beliefs, the questions' internal logic and survey data analysis both argue that in these cases, beliefs also affect knowledge.
Science education and outreach efforts commonly aim to communicate basic information that underlies scientific conclusions. An information-to-conclusions ordering follows the natural logic of science, but it fares less well with public opinion on politicized topics where biased assimilation works in the opposite direction. Even well-established observations may be discounted in favor of ideologically more palatable claims available to anyone with television or an Internet connection. Where science communication encounters this roadblock, an alternative strategy could more directly address prevalent misinformation: At an early stage, raise the questions and discuss evidence regarding popular misconceptions such as "Arctic ice has 2 recovered" or "volcanoes emit more CO ." Some science-based websites and outreach activities have been pioneering this approach, with encouraging success. The phrase "teach the controversy" has typically been identified with attacks against evolution in schools, but for the severely polarized public discourse on climate it might be constructively repurposed.
ENDNOTES
[1] For example, unpublished analysis of the 2010 General Social Survey finds a Democrat-Republican gap of 20 points on human evolution (evolved), 20 points on abortion (abany), and 31 points on whether a temperature rise from climate change would be dangerous for the environment (tempgen1). More starkly-worded questions asked on a July 2012 statewide poll in New Hampshire elicit a Democrat-Republican gap of 26 points on human evolution, 41 points on legal abortion and 51 points on whether human activities are changing the climate. same or more CO , so alternative models such as ordered logit might be considered. Empirically, however, our responses do not follow ordinal patterns, as results in Tables 2 and 3 clearly show. That is, the response categories may be ordinal in terms of physical quantities they reference, but not in terms of relationships with predictors in the models. Brant tests confirm this impression, and lead to rejection of the parallel-regression hypothesis for ordered-logit models corresponding to 13 of the 18 regressions in this paper if we simply set DK/NA responses aside, and to 18 out of 18 if we keep those responses in with ordinal coding instead. Finally, the DK/NA responses, which are most sensibly set aside for an ordinal analysis, hold key information about who knows what, as revealed by the multinomial analysis.
[5] From a scientific viewpoint, a great deal of background information should be relevant to beliefs about climate. Nonscientists, however, will see some of the connections more clearly than others. Table 2 , with adjustment for other predictors in the model.
